Orthopoxvirus that can cause infections in humans and a variety of animals. Infections occur in Eurasia; infections in humans and animals have not been reported in the United States. This report describes the occurrence of the first known human case of laboratory-acquired cowpox virus infection in the United States and the ensuing investigation.
Background. Cowpox virus is an
Orthopoxvirus that can cause infections in humans and a variety of animals. Infections occur in Eurasia; infections in humans and animals have not been reported in the United States. This report describes the occurrence of the first known human case of laboratory-acquired cowpox virus infection in the United States and the ensuing investigation.
Methods. The patient and laboratory personnel were interviewed, and laboratory activities were reviewed. Real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and serologic assays were used to test the patient's specimens. PCR assays were used to test specimens obtained during the investigation.
Results. A specimen from the patient's lesion tested positive for cowpox virus DNA. Genome sequencing revealed a recombinant region consistent with a strain of cowpox virus stored in the research laboratory's freezer. Cowpox virus contamination was detected in 6 additional laboratory stocks of viruses. Orthopoxvirus DNA was present in 3 of 20 environmental swabs taken from laboratory surfaces.
Conclusions. The handling of contaminated reagents or contact with contaminated surfaces was likely the mode of transmission. Delays in recognition and diagnosis of this infection in a laboratory researcher underscore the importance of a thorough patient history-including occupational information-and laboratory testing in facilitating a prompt investigation and application of control and remediation measures.
Cowpox virus is an Orthopoxvirus that can cause infections in a taxonomically wide variety of animals, including humans. In humans, cowpox virus infections are generally self-limiting; however, there have been several reports of severe and fatal illness in individuals with dermatitis, eczema, or immunocompromising conditions [1] [2] [3] [4] . Similar to other Orthopoxvirus infections, cowpox infections usually result in the development of at least 1 firm, umbilicated, painful lesion that progresses from macule to papule to vesicle to pustule, and, finally, to crust. Patients often experience lymphadenopathy, fever, and flu-like illness [5] . Orthopoxvirus infections, including cowpox, are transmissible by contact with lesions or matter from lesion exudates. Lesions are considered capable of producing infectious material until the crust falls off and an intact layer of skin forms.
Infections have been reported from Europe and Russia, where the virus is enzootic. Human infections are often associated with contact with an ill domestic cat, rat, or zoo animal [5] . Occupationally acquired cowpox infections have been reported among veterinarians and animal handlers [3, [6] [7] [8] [9] . Neither human nor animal infection has been reported in the United States. A variety of poxviruses, including Orthopoxviruses, are used by laboratories, either as the subject of research or as tools (genetic vectors). Laboratory-acquired infections with vaccinia virus (also an Orthopoxvirus) have been documented [10] [11] [12] , but, to date, there have been no reports of accidental laboratoryacquired cowpox virus infections. In the United States, vaccination with vaccinia virus is recommended for those who may have exposure to cowpox virus, namely, laboratory researchers [13] .
We report a case of laboratory-acquired cowpox virus infection occurring in a patient who worked with a non-Orthopoxvirus Chordopoxvirus (NOC) in a research laboratory, which also had stocks of cowpox virus stored in a freezer. The patient had no history of smallpox vaccination. The infection began as a painful, ulcerated lesion on a finger. The patient saw multiple physicians, including a dermatologist and hand surgeon, prior to undergoing tests for Orthopoxvirus infection. Confirmation of the presence of cowpox virus DNA in the clinical specimen was made after resolution of the lesion. The delay in obtaining etiologic confirmation meant that public health authorities were not informed and an investigation was not initiated some time after the illness had resolved.
Given the occupational history of the patient and the absence of endemic cowpox virus in the United States, investigators focused on determining whether the exposure occurred outside the context of the research laboratory or as a result of inadvertent exposure in the laboratory environment. The patient worked with NOC in the laboratory before and after lesion onset; also, cowpox virus was stored in the laboratory's freezer, but no known use of cowpox virus in the laboratory had occurred during the prior 5 years. Extensive sampling, both of laboratory reagents and the environment, and complete characterization of the patient's infection were necessary to understand the sources of infection and mitigate any further risks to the patient and others.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Analysis of Clinical Specimens
Frozen biopsy tissue and serum specimens were shipped to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for testing. DNA was extracted from the biopsy sample [14] , and real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays specific for nonvariola virus Orthopoxviruses [15] , vaccinia virus, cowpox virus, and NOC were performed. Methods for the real-time PCR assays are available upon request. Serologic testing for Orthopoxvirus immunoglobulin G and immunoglobulin M (IgM) antibodies was conducted [16] on 2 serum specimens obtained from the patient.
The hemagglutinin gene of cowpox virus was sequenced from the patient's biopsy specimen. The viral genome was sequenced using the 454 FLX Titanium instrument. The sequence was de novo assembled using the CLC Bio Genomics Workbench, and the contigs (a series of overlapping DNA sequences) were compared to the sequence of known transgenic cowpox strains.
Analysis of Specimens Obtained From the Research Laboratory
The research laboratory provided samples of 32 virus and 9 cell culture stocks for testing. These samples were selected for testing on the basis of the following criteria: (1) the stocks were used by members of the laboratory during the period of the patient's exposure (29 June-8 July); (2) the stocks were used by the patient during the exposure period; and/or (3) the stocks were provided to external laboratories. Specimens were tested for the presence of non-variola virus Orthopoxviruses, cowpox virus, and/or NOC by real-time PCR, as described above. An initial set of viral and cell culture stocks were tested for the presence of cowpox virus only, and any sample that tested positive for cowpox virus was also tested for the presence of NOC. A second set of viral and cell culture stocks were tested for the presence of non-variola virus Orthopoxviruses only.
Additionally, 20 environmental samples were obtained by swabbing surfaces that were determined to have the highest potential to have been exposed to virus. Epicentre CatchAll Sample Collection Swabs were used. In addition to DNA extraction, the environmental swabs were put into viral culture medium for 14 days and assayed for growth/cytopathic effect on monkey kidney tissue culture at regular intervals. The viral culture medium was Roswell Park Memorial Institute medium (Life Technologies) supplemented with 2% heat-inactivated fetal bovine serum (Atlas Biologicals), 2 mM L-glutamine (Life Technologies), 100 U/mL penicillin (Life Technologies), and 100 mg/mL streptomycin (Life Technologies).
Assessment of Research Laboratory
All laboratory personnel who had worked in the laboratory since the patient's lesion onset (from 1 July 2010 through 18 October 2010) were interviewed. Personnel at the institution who had worked or were working with poxviruses were interviewed to determine whether they also possessed cowpox virus isolates.
Laboratory notebooks of all personnel who had worked in the laboratory since 1 April 2010 were reviewed to obtain information regarding whether contamination of laboratory reagents or stocks may have occurred, the types and number of cell and viral stocks in use, and the types and nature of the work activities that occurred in the laboratory.
RESULTS
Case Report
The patient, who worked in a research laboratory, developed a painful, ulcerated lesion on the palmar surface of the third digit of the right hand a few days after 8 July 2010 (Table 1) . By 13 July, the patient had developed swelling and pain in the right axillary lymph node, fever, chills, body aches, mild headaches, and pain at the lesion site; with the exception of pain, these symptoms lasted for 5 days. The patient reported pain throughout the course of the infection. Additionally, there was inflammation, edema, swelling, and loss of range of movement of the finger at the site of the lesion. The patient visited a physician at the institution's health center on 14 July, and a presumptive diagnosis of Mycobacterium infection was made because the patient had made frequent visits to a local swimming facility. A punch biopsy specimen was obtained on 14 July. The specimen yielded Staphylococcus organisms on culture, results of acid-fast staining were negative, and culture was negative for Mycobacterium organisms. The patient's condition did not improve with levofloxacin and clindamycin, and the patient was seen on 19 July by a physician at the institution's health center, who works extensively with infectious diseases cases. This physician noted that the patient worked in a laboratory that had prior members who received vaccinia virus vaccine at the health center and that lesion looked similar to vaccinia virus infection; however, the patient emphasized that vaccinia virus was not currently used in the research laboratory. From 19 July on, the patient continued to see this physician daily for several weeks to monitor the infection. On 21 July, the patient saw a dermatologist, who provided a presumptive diagnosis of a spider bite. On 23 July, the patient was seen by a hand surgeon, who performed debridement of necrotic tissue. The lesion continued to be very painful, with expansion of edema and swelling, and pain spread through the entire finger and adjacent fingers. The dermatologist performed a biopsy on 29 July, and a pathologist determined that the characteristics of the affected tissue appeared consistent with a viral infection. The patient recalled the lesion resolving on or around 1 October. On 18 October, the patient reported scarring, residual pain, and loss of range of movement at the site of the lesion.
On 5 October 2010, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was contacted by the patient's second physician at the institution's health center (first seen on July 19) about testing the patient's specimens for suspected vaccinia virus infection, and the state Department of Public Health was notified. Two serum samples collected from the patient on 19 July and 4 October were tested using an enzyme-linked immunosorbant assay, and the specimen from 4 October was found to have significant titers of Orthopoxvirus IgM antibodies (OD-COV 0.054), consistent with a recent Orthopoxvirus infection [16] . Non-variola virus Orthopoxvirus DNA was amplified from the biopsy specimen, using real-time PCR. There was no DNA amplification in an assay specific for detection of vaccinia virus DNA, but there was DNA amplification in a real-time PCR assay specific for cowpox virus. The cowpox virus hemagglutinin gene was sequenced from DNA prepared from the patient's tissue biopsy specimen. There was sequence identity to the Brighton strain of cowpox virus, a strain commonly used in laboratories.
Laboratory Observations
The patient worked in a research laboratory with a NOC that does not cause infection in humans. The patient performed a variety of tasks with viral and cell lines, including propagation and injection of viral genetic constructs into mice. The principal investigator of the research laboratory where the patient worked reported that the cowpox virus stocks had been stored in the freezer for the previous 5 years, with no known use, movement, or distribution of the virus. At this institution, only the laboratory in which the patient worked possessed cowpox virus.
In addition to work as a laboratory researcher, the patient performed pathology work in a separate laboratory. The patient had not performed any gross pathology work in the 2 weeks prior to lesion onset and did not begin working in this laboratory until after lesion onset (23 July). The only animal contact the patient had in the 2 weeks prior to lesion onset was with the patient's own companion animals (dogs and cats) and with laboratory mice used for research. None of the patient's laboratory colleagues, household family members, or companion animals exhibited symptoms of Orthopoxvirus infection. Upon being hired to work in the laboratory, all personnel were told by the principal investigator that there were stocks of Orthopoxvirus species, including cowpox virus and vaccinia virus, in the freezer, and all personnel were offered vaccination with vaccinia virus. All personnel declined vaccination and signed a declination form, with the understanding that they could request this vaccine at a later date. Laboratory personnel reported that they were only working with a poxvirus that was not pathogenic for humans and, thus, declined vaccinia vaccine because there was low to no risk of exposure to a human pathogen in the research laboratory. Only the principal investigator of the laboratory had been vaccinated with vaccinia virus within the last 10 years, and no other personnel in the laboratory recalled that they had been vaccinated with this vaccine during their lifetime.
There were at least 34 tubes of wild-type and recombinant cowpox virus stocks in a shared freezer. The cowpox virus stocks were maintained in several boxes within 1 rack in the freezer, and some of the boxes contained several poxvirus species, including cowpox virus and the NOC used by all members of the laboratory (7 people). All members of the laboratory had access to the boxes and tubes containing human pathogens, and all denied knowingly removing a cowpox virus stock from the freezer. Labels on some of the tubes were difficult to read because of frost accumulation.
The patient conducted experiments that involved injecting the NOC into mice. Interviews and a notebook review revealed that 4 of 5 mice injected on 29 June exhibited unanticipated lesions. Two of the mice had lesion onset on 9 July. At the time, investigators were able to culture Staphylococcus organisms from the lesions, and, thus, potential Orthopoxvirus infection of the mice was not considered. Descriptions of the lesions (umbilicated "bumps" with a central area of necrosis) and date of lesion onset (10 days after inoculation) were consistent with potential cowpox virus infection. Testing of viral stocks revealed that the mice with suspect lesions were injected with a viral line contaminated with cowpox virus. The condition of the mice deteriorated, and the mice were euthanized in late July. Additionally, the investigation revealed that research mice had been unintentionally injected with cowpox virus in October and had not developed lesions; these mice were subsequently euthanized.
The patient did not recall an accidental needle stick at any time while performing work involving animals. Personnel reported always wearing disposable gloves, gowns, shoe covers, and hats in the animal room; these items were disposed of before leaving the room and subsequently autoclaved. Several persons recounted rarely wearing a laboratory coat in the main laboratory and only wearing gloves while working in the biosafety cabinet. Personnel noted moving contaminated gloves in and out of the biosafety cabinet while working. Gloves were not always worn while handling live virus or cell cultures, particularly when moving these to and from the incubator and freezer. The patient noted inconsistent glove use in the main laboratory, especially with a painful lesion surrounded by swelling, which made wearing gloves difficult and painful.
Analysis of Samples
Thirty-two NOC viral lines and 9 cell culture lines used in the patient's laboratory were tested for the presence of cowpox virus or non-variola virus Orthopoxvirus DNA ( Table 2) . Cowpox virus or non-variola virus Orthopoxvirus DNA was not amplified from 9 cell culture lines. Cowpox virus DNA was amplified from 6 of 19 NOC viral lines (31.6%). DNA from NOC was also amplified from all 6 NOC viral samples that were contaminated with cowpox virus DNA. contaminated samples (66.7%) were propagated by the same laboratory worker (who was not the patient). The virus stock that was used by the patient prior to the formation of the lesion contained cowpox virus DNA; this aliquot was originally propagated in May 2010. Additionally, this contaminated viral stock was injected into the mice with suspect lesions in July 2010. Original viral stocks provided to the principal investigator from a colleague at a different institution several years prior were not positive for cowpox virus or non-variola virus Orthopoxvirus DNA, using PCR assays.
PCR assays of 3 of 20 environment swabs specimens (15%) were positive for non-variola virus Orthopoxvirus DNA ( Table 3 ). The positive swabs specimens were obtained from swabbing pipettors in the main laboratory, the handle of the freezer where all viral stocks (including NOC and cowpox virus stocks) were stored, and the outside and inside of the box where only NOCs were stored. Viral growth was not detected from any environmental swab specimens placed into laboratory culture.
As a result of the contamination of NOC stocks with cowpox virus, (1) the patient was working with live cowpox virus and NOC, and (2) both viruses were maintained in coculture and injected into live animals. Accordingly, we investigated the possibility of the emergence of and infection with a novel recombinant virus. The patient's biopsy sample was tested for the presence of NOC DNA, using real-time PCR, and there was no amplification. To ascertain the nature of the virus that caused the patient's infection, whole genome sequencing was conducted. The viral sequence revealed a recombinant region consistent with recombinant cowpox virus strains stored in the laboratory's freezer. The viral genome did not contain any DNA sequences from the NOC.
Laboratory remediation occurred within 2 weeks after the conclusion of the on-site investigation. This included complete environmental decontamination, destruction of the contaminated viral isolates, and separation of NOC and pathogenic viral stocks into clearly labeled boxes.
DISCUSSION
This investigation of a laboratory-acquired infection with an
Orthopoxvirus highlights the drawbacks of clinical reliance on patient recall about potential exposures, occupational or otherwise. The patient did not think that cowpox virus was actively being used in the laboratory and did not divulge to the physicians that this virus was maintained in the laboratory's freezer. In addition, reporting was delayed. Unexplained, potential laboratory-acquired infections among laboratory workers should be promptly reported to appropriate institutional and occupational health officials, as well as to public health authorities. Even if the infection is not laboratory confirmed, prompt notification of officials can lead to a faster diagnosis and application of appropriate prevention and control measures [11] . With zoonotic diseases that are not endemic to an area, prompt testing and reporting is essential to prevent further cases and to prevent the establishment of the disease in either human or animal populations [17] . After this event, the state issued a reporting reminder to all institutional health clinics that emphasized the immediate notification of a suspect or confirmed Orthopoxvirus infection.
The occurrence of this case also underscores unacknowledged risks to personnel in a research environment [10] . Although not known to be actively used by laboratory personnel at the time of the patient's infection, cowpox virus was present in the freezer, and removal of a tube of cowpox virus was a real possibility. Remediation included separation of the viral species into separate boxes and destruction of contaminated stocks. Additionally, contaminants in the laboratory constituted a persistent risk to workers until remediation was completed. There were lapses in best laboratory practices, which have been addressed by additional education about biosafety and use of appropriate personal protective equipment in the laboratory environment.
Since multiple viral stocks were propagated with 2 viral species (NOC and cowpox virus), a concern generated during this investigation was the potential for generation of a novel recombinant organism with unknown characteristics and properties. A recombinant organism can potentially complicate or evade detection by molecular diagnostic assays. Although standard diagnostic tests were used to diagnose this patient's infection, whole genome sequencing still was used to completely describe the virus and rule out or characterize a novel recombinant.
Human Orthopoxvirus infections can be severe, particularly in individuals with a risk factor for severe complications, including those with an immunocompromising condition, eczema or other similar skin conditions, or pregnancy [5] . Current recommendations by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices include vaccination of laboratory workers who handle culture or animals infected with Orthopoxviruses, including cowpox virus, that infect humans [13] . Historically, the effectiveness of the vaccine against cowpox virus has been questioned by others [5, 18] . There is no immediate need to consider vaccination for this research laboratory if (1) complete remediation of the laboratory's environment is accomplished, (2) all materials not labeled and segregated as cowpox virus or vaccinia virus are free of Orthopoxvirus contamination, and (3) no work with Orthopoxviruses will occur in the laboratory.
Overall, the data suggest that the patient was likely infected by handling laboratory stock virus reagents or contact with environmental surfaces that were contaminated with cowpox virus. Because some environmental surfaces contained non-variola virus Orthopoxvirus DNA and contamination of multiple viral stocks with cowpox virus was pervasive, it is difficult to pinpoint the source of the infection or exposure. Three environmental swab specimens also yielded non-variola virus Orthopoxvirus DNA but no viral growth. It is important to note that the period when there was evidence that cowpox virus was in viral cultures (May, June, July, and August 2010) was at least 2 months earlier than the date of environmental sampling (October 2010). Thus, it is highly unlikely that if live Orthopoxvirus was on the laboratory surfaces during the summer that the virus would still be viable when the swab specimens were obtained in October. There was, however, slight potential for infectious virus to exist on the box stored in the freezer. Nevertheless, several surfaces could have contained Orthopoxvirus DNA during the period when the patient was infected.
Clinicians and healthcare professionals should be attentive to the potential of Orthopoxvirus infection when examining patients with a vesiculo-pustular rash or lesion, especially if the patient works in a laboratory with poxviruses. Occupational exposures are important to consider when a laboratory worker presents with an unexplained illness. Prompt recognition, diagnosis, and reporting of Orthopoxvirus infections to appropriate institutional officials and public health agencies can help reinforce appropriate infection control practices and limit further transmission of the pathogen. Vaccination is an important consideration for all individuals at risk of exposure to an Orthopoxvirus, including cowpox virus.
Notes
